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1. Introduction: the Commonwealth’s extractive interest 
 
The centrality of extractive industry to Australian political and economic history is 
well known.1 Extractive interests have long occupied a dominant position in the 
Australian policy landscape, and the prioritisation of extractive interests in 
Commonwealth policy has been a perennial theme of political debate at both state and 
federal levels. The extent to which the Commonwealth’s close identification of the 
national interest with the interests of extractive industry influences its international 
conduct resurfaced as a hard question for Australian international lawyers following 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) proceedings in Timor-Leste v. Australia 
(Questions relating to the Seizure and Detention of Certain Documents and Data) in 
2013 – 2015, and the subsequent criminal proceedings against whistleblowing 
intelligence officer Witness K and their solicitor, Bernard Collaery. 2  The 
Commonwealth’s alleged espionage in 2004 of newly independent Timor Leste 
during negotiations over Timor Sea boundary delimitation in the Greater Sunrise oil 
and gas field was widely condemned as a moral scandal, as much as one of law or 
diplomacy. 3  Much coverage treated the Commonwealth’s aggressive pursuit of 
extractive rights – in that case allegedly beyond the threshold of legality – as 
egregious, but atypical.  
This framing works to obscure the fact that expanding the field of sovereign 
extractive rights and furthering the interests of extractive industry have long been 
organising objectives in Australia’s engagements with international law and 
diplomacy. Those objectives have often placed Australia at odds with the 
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international community.4 From a liberal internationalist perspective, furthering the 
economic interests of primary industry is a straightforward objective of any national 
government’s engagement with international law, and in particular, treaty 
negotiations.5 As such, prioritising the interests of one of Australia’s emblematic 
industries in international legal negotiations is an uncontroversial objective. From a 
decolonial perspective, however, that objective demonstrates clear continuity with the 
era of colonial and imperial expansion that preceded twentieth century liberal 
internationalism. That continuity is ever more troubling as the global climate crisis 
escalates, and the regulation of resource extraction in domains beyond national 
jurisdiction resurfaces as an acute geopolitical fault line, particularly with respect to 
Antarctica and outer space.  
This chapter revisits the prioritisation of extractive interests in Australia’s historical 
approach to international treaty negotiations, with a focus on Australia’s position on 
resource exploitation in the Antarctic, the international seabed, and outer space 
between 1958 and 1991. As the international decolonisation movements of the mid-
20th century challenged the legal architecture of resource rights established under 
imperial and colonial rule, the legal status of natural resources in the Antarctic, oceans 
beyond national jurisdiction, and bodies in near earth space became focal points of 
diplomatic contention over the mid- to late twentieth century. Between the late 1950s 
and the late 1980s, a series of protracted – and in formal terms, largely failed – 
negotiations over the regulatory principles that should govern resource extraction in 
domains beyond national jurisdiction took place. These debates occurred both within 
the UN framework, in the case of the seabed and outer space, and pointedly outside it, 
in the case of Antarctica.  
The turn toward international regulation of extractive activity in domains beyond 
national jurisdiction occurred at the intersection of multiple strands of twentieth 
century international history. First, direct unilateral annexation of territory lost 
legitimacy after the First World War settlements, in diplomatic if not strictly legal 
terms. Ironically, this intensified doctrinal debates over the international law of 
territorial acquisition, as states sought to anchor their contested territorial claims in 
pre-war conduct.6 Secondly, the sharp increase in formal participation of decolonising 
states in international organisations and the creation of negotiating blocs like the Non-
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Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) cast 
further shadow over the rules of territorial acquisition and natural resource rights 
developed by the European powers over the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.7 
Thirdly, the experiments in internationalisation of territory developed through the 
League mandate system and the subsequent UN trusteeship system popularised – even 
through myriad flaws and contradictions – the possibility of multilateral oversight of 
activity in contested areas.8  
Fourthly, the instability inherent in a global economy built through colonial and 
imperial expansion was laid bare in a series of ructions in fossil fuel supply chains, 
beginning with the Anglo-Iranian oil crisis of 1951–1952 and culminating in the 
OPEC oil crisis of 1973.9 This raised the spectre not only of escalating conflict over 
natural resources, an established mainstay of inter-imperial trade negotiations, but 
also of natural resource exhaustion. Fifthly, technological and scientific advancements 
– themselves inextricable from the military imperatives of the Cold War – rendered 
the prospect of mining the poles, the seabed and near earth bodies in space a 
realizable horizon. Lastly, the discourses of environmental protection, economic 
development and ‘scientific internationalism’ – all with strong albeit unstable 
intersections with post-war development discourse – began to emerge as organising 
concerns of the post-war United Nations.10 Debates over the legal status of domains 
beyond national jurisdiction in this period therefore presaged many of the debates 
over substantive decolonisation, global political economy, and international co-
operation on environmental risk that have come to dominate the field of international 
law in the opening decades of the twenty-first century.  
Against this historical backdrop, this chapter considers the Commonwealth’s carriage 
of international negotiations over resource extraction in Antarctica, outer space and 
the seabed. It focuses on four moments of treaty negotiation: first, the negotiation of 
the Antarctic Treaty in 1959, against the prospect of UN oversight over the ‘last 
continent’; second, the seabed resource debates from the late 1960s through to the 
early 1980s, punctuated by the 1970 Declaration of Principles governing the Seabed 
and Ocean Floor and Part XI of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (LOSC); third, the space resource debates from the late 1960s through to the 
early 1980s, centred around the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and the 1979 Agreement 
Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the Moon 
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Agreement); and lastly, the discussion circles back to the debate over Antarctic 
minerals revived in the 1980s, culminating in the failed 1988 Convention on the 
Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA). The chapter argues 
that the Commonwealth’s foundational objective across all three treaty frameworks 
has been to secure and expand the field of sovereign resource rights, and its right to 
grant and profit from extractive interests. The Commonwealth’s prioritisation of its 
own extractive interests has been consistent across all three domains. The normative 
mantles of Cold War scientific internationalism, of the ‘common heritage of mankind’ 
(CHM) principle adopted with respect to the international seabed and space, and of 
environmental protection – culminating in a moratorium on mining in Antarctica in 
the early 1990s – have been strategically adopted in service of that ultimate objective. 
The chapter concludes that this history not only tempers contemporary popular 
narratives that figure Australia as a ‘good international citizen’ with respect to 
Antarctica, the seabed and space; it has predictive value with respect to Australia’s 
likely conduct as the treaty regimes governing all three domains come under renewed 
strain.  
2. Australian extractivism and the post-war international 
The centrality of extractive industry to twentieth-century Australian economic and 
political history is one of the agreed facts of domestic political culture. There is, 
however, little systematic analysis of the extent to which the domestic dominance of 
extractive industry has influenced Australia’s conduct of international law. On one 
level, this is unremarkable. National governments from across the political spectrum 
are open about promoting the interests of domestic industry in their foreign policy, at 
least in questions of international trade. The Commonwealth government’s 
commitment to refracting questions of international principle through the prism of 
sovereign resource rights established itself early in Australia’s practice of external 
affairs.11 The close identification of the federal government with extractive industry 
has manifest itself in various ways. These range from the historical, including the 
Commonwealth’s early experiences in asserting its independence from the British 
imperial government by claiming ownership of resources in Papua and Nauru;12 to the 
personal, involving the career trajectories of highly influential Australian statesmen 
who have worked across both government and extractive industry, Richard Casey and 
Alexander Downer among them; 13  to the sociological, reflecting the extractive 
industry’s pervasive influence on electoral politics and on traditional media.  
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Given the centrality of extractive industry in Australian economic and political affairs, 
it should be unsurprising that extractive interests have occupied a central position in 
the Commonwealth’s carriage of its international obligations. Nearly all instances of 
Australia’s active participation in International Court of Justice proceedings have 
intersected with attempts to extend or defend Australia’s extraterritorial resource 
rights, whether historical or contemporary.14 The dispute at the heart of Portugal v 
Australia (the East Timor case) emerged from the Whitlam government’s extensive 
negotiations with Indonesia over ownership of oil and gas reserves in the Timor Sea.15 
Nauru v Australia (the Certain Phosphate Lands case) dealt directly with Australia’s 
breach of its mandate and trusteeship obligations in its exploitation of Nauruan 
phosphate.16 Australia v Japan (the Whaling case), celebrated as a defence of the 
Antarctic marine environment, was at the same time a territorial defence of 
Australia’s claim to an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) for the Australian Antarctic 
Territory (AAT).17 At the other end of international lawmaking, the defence and 
expansion of resource rights claims has also been an organising objective in 
Australia’s approach to treaty negotiations over resource extraction in domains 
beyond national jurisdiction, to which this chapter now turns.  
The question of whether and how extractive activity in areas beyond recognised 
sovereign jurisdiction should be regulated is a foundational issue of international 
law.18 The issue re-emerged as a central question of multilateral diplomacy in the 
decades after the second World War. As the post-war decolonisation movements rose 
to their peak, the various strands of contest over the legal status of Antarctica, outer 
space and the seabed were increasingly woven together in diplomatic debate. Between 
the 1950s and the early 1980s, the presumption of the former colonial and imperial 
powers to set the terms of diplomatic debate came under mounting scrutiny, as 
membership of international organisations swelled and the numeric balance of power 
shifted toward decolonising states. Most relevantly here, international administration 
of contested territory was increasingly raised by developing states as a mode of Third 
World participation in – rather than subjugation to – international law, as had been the 
case under the mandate and trusteeship regimes.19 Whilst this chapter deals with each 
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regime in loose chronological order, this obscures the cross-pollinating evolution of 
all three treaty frameworks. Negotiating parties frequently consisted of the same 
executives, advised by the same departments and the same international lawyers. As a 
result, negotiators and advisers frequently articulated both the problems requiring 
regulation – from territorial annexation, military use and resource exploitation, to 
environmental protection and international equity – and the range of potential 
solutions to those problems – from legal concepts to institutional design – with a view 
to their position in another or all three of these diplomatic debates. 
This shifting complex of treaty negotiations was anchored by common rhetorical 
elements. First was the framing of post-war technological development as an 
unprecedented and shared regulatory challenge, a framing central to constructing and 
maintaining the nuclear Cold War.20 Second was the unstable international divide 
between ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ states, a divide that loosely and at times only 
rhetorically mapped onto US-Soviet bipolarity in international organisations. Third 
was the coalescing concept of the common heritage of mankind.21 A conceptual 
bricolage in its early iterations, the common heritage of mankind principle 
incorporated competing elements from discrete fields of public and private law, 
including from Grotian reworkings of the Roman law notion of res communis omnium, 
and from early twentieth century experiments with internationalisation of contested 
territory.22 The concept of common heritage, and its ungainly translation into legal 
principle, is most directly associated with the seabed regime in Part XI of the Law of 
the Sea Convention.23 But the definition and scope of the principle was worked 
through at the intersection of all three debates, even if formally adopted only in the 
seabed and space treaty frameworks, and even then in markedly different ways.  
A central contention of this chapter is that Australia’s position in the common 
heritage debates of the 1960s and 1970s was informed less by a consistent approach 
to the CHM principle itself, than by the Commonwealth’s overriding focus on 
expanding the field of sovereign resource claims on the one hand, and its historical 
antipathy to regimes of internationalised administrative oversight – namely the 
League mandate and UN trusteeship regimes – on the other.24 A second contention is 
that the Commonwealth’s position on both fronts – for an expanding field of 
sovereign resource rights, and against internationalised administrative oversight – 
were honed a decade in advance of CHM debates over the seabed and space, during 
post-war debates over the legal status of Antarctica in the 1950s. The Australian 
colonies had been directly interested in the British empire’s aspirations to Antarctic 
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territory prior to federation in 1901.25 Australia’s inherited claim to the Antarctic, and 
its subsequent role in Antarctic Treaty negotiations over the 1950s, directly informed 
its carriage of treaty negotiations over CHM that gained momentum a decade later 
with respect to the seabed and space. At the same time, the Commonwealth’s broader 
attitude to proposals for regulation of resource extraction in all three areas was shaped 
by its experiences in the earlier twentieth century as Administering Authority in New 
Guinea and Nauru, first under the League of Nations mandate system and then the UN 
trusteeship system.26 The Commonwealth’s prior experience with Antarctic claims on 
the one hand, and with administering territory under international oversight on the 
other, formed the ground on which it approached the CHM debates from the late 
1960s.   
3. The Antarctic Treaty system: territory against trusteeship  
Scholars of Australia’s relationship to Antarctica have long observed that the 
continent has occupied an integral place in the Australian imperial imaginary.27 Well 
before federation, Antarctica constituted a ‘Southern frontier’ in the Australian 
colonies’ expansionist aspirations.28 Moreover, those aspirations were not limited to a 
Monrovian exclusion of competing empires, or to the establishment of a regional 
‘sphere of influence’.29 Rather, Australian Antarctic aspirations were from the outset 
for full territorial sovereignty over an expansive area of the continent and adjacent 
waters, and have remained so ever since. The Commonwealth derived its territorial 
claim from the British Imperial government. Britain’s formal Antarctic claim was 
made in 1908 by extending the scope of its 1833 Falkland Islands claim. The extent of 
that extended claim was clarified in 1917.30 A further British claim was made in 1923 
over the Ross Sea sector for administration by New Zealand, expanding the British 
claim to around two thirds of the continent. As Dominion independence over external 
affairs solidified over the 1920s, shoring up the British Antarctic claim became a key 
issue in the Imperial Conferences of 1926, 1930 and 1937.31 In 1933, the larger part 
of the British claim was transferred to the Commonwealth, becoming known as the 
Australian Antarctic Territory (AAT), spanning just over 40% of the continent.32  
However, Britain’s ambition for full incorporation of Antarctica within the empire 
was frustrated by France’s preceding 1840 claim to Adélie Land – a sectoral claim 
that cut through the claimed AAT – and Norway’s subsequent claim to Queen Maud 
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Land in 1939. Each of the British, Australian, New Zealand, French and Norwegian 
claims were made on the basis of pre-war international laws of territorial acquisition. 
Modes of demonstrating territorial occupation recognised in international law – 
including permanent constructions, sustained physical presence, and evidence of 
mapping and surveying – were emphasised within the British Foreign Office from the 
early twentieth century as crucial to maintaining the territorial claim. However, the 
status of all claims was complicated further still by the subsequent claims of 
Argentina and Chile, both of which overlapped with areas of British claim. Although 
made formally as late as the early 1940s, both Argentina and Chile claimed title 
derived by succession of prior Spanish claim and maintained through consistent 
activity amounting to occupation.33  
After the Second World War, the territorial conflict over Antarctica attracted 
increasing international attention. As the new UN system took shape, former League 
mandates were placed under international trusteeship, and the UN Charter was 
declared to apply to all ‘non-self-governing territories’. As international oversight was 
asserted over colonial territories, all Antarctic claimants were concerned to establish 
full sovereign rights and avoid UN intervention in Antarctic affairs. The United States 
too was at pains to avoid subjecting the question of Antarctic governance to formal 
international scrutiny, not least by the Soviet Union.34  Unwilling to relinquish both 
the right to make a future sovereign claim itself and its political leverage over 
claimant parties, the US intervened in escalating tensions between the UK, Argentina 
and Chile.35  In 1948, the US proposed a condominium arrangement of shared 
sovereignty over Antarctica between existing claimants. The condominium proposal 
received some traction among claimant states; but Australia resisted it, primarily to 
avoid relinquishing exclusive sovereign rights to natural resources within the claimed 
AAT.36  
While the US condominium proposal failed, it crystallised a process of negotiations 
between Antarctic claimants that continued throughout the 1950s. The question of 
Antarctica’s legal status became an arena, albeit a less apparent one, of Cold War 
realpolitik.37 For its part, the Soviet Union formalised its Antarctic position in 1950, 
making clear it would not recognise any regime brokered by the US without its 
participation.38 With little common ground established between claimant states in the 
early 1950s, evidenced by the UK’s institution of ICJ proceedings against Argentina 
and Chile in 1955, Antarctic negotiations attracted increasing attention within the new 
UN. In 1956, India made an unexpected move to promote the UN as the appropriate 
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forum for internationalised Antarctic governance.39 India’s Antarctic initiative was 
spearheaded by Krishna Menon, the first official High Commissioner of India to the 
United Kingdom and a close associate of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru.40 Both 
Nehru and Menon had proven key advocates of developing world solidarity in the 
1955 Bandung Conference and in the new Non-Aligned Movement, and saw the 
Antarctic question as a vehicle for challenging colonial powers’ circumvention of the 
new UN system.41 At Menon’s instigation, India made preliminary moves toward 
listing ‘the Question of Antarctica’ for debate in the UN General Assembly. In its 
early iteration, India’s case was that the UN trusteeship system provided a model of 
internationalised territorial oversight for Antarctica, against the prospect of 
administration by a closed club of imperial claimants. Menon’s personal advocacy of 
global disarmament provided additional impetus to India’s move. Throughout the 
1950s, the Soviet Union alleged that the US and Britain planned to use Antarctic 
territory for nuclear weapons testing, allegations clearly within the realm of 
possibility at that time.42 The US had been conducting nuclear testing in the Pacific 
from 1946, using its ‘strategic trust territory’ of the Pacific Islands as its nuclear 
‘proving ground’.43 British nuclear testing in Australia had commenced in 1952, 
moving inland to Maralinga in South Australia in 1955.44  
The prospect of international jurisdiction over Antarctica was taken as a serious 
challenge by all Antarctic claimants. Britain, Australia and New Zealand were 
particularly taken aback, given India’s position within the CommonwealthThe 
claimants’ alliance against the prospect of UN debate was resolute. Claimants took 
pains to emphasise that the trusteeship model was relevant only to the governance of 
populated regions, and unsuitable for unpopulated domains; as one British Foreign 
Office official put it in 1956, the ‘whole object of trusteeship is to safeguard interests 
of local inhabitants who do not exist in this case’.45 Reassessing its position in the 
fast-moving high diplomacy of the mid-1950s, India opted to amend its proposal for 
UN trusteeship of Antarctica, instead submitting a call for ‘peaceful utilisation’ of the 
continent in October 1956. That call emphasised disarmament and demilitarisation, 
and avoided raising hard questions of territorial acquisition that would destabilise 
Commonwealth relations.46   
Although shortlived on its own terms, the Indian initiative galvanised Antarctic 
claimants; according to Howkins, ‘(o)pposition to India’s proposal in 1956 not only 
helped to lay the foundations for the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, but it also set the tone for 
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the future defence of the Antarctic Treaty system’.47 This was especially so for 
Australia, Britain and New Zealand, each with UN trust territories of their own. After 
heading off the danger of UN debate over Antarctic trusteeship, claimant states 
refocused themselves on reaching a settlement that avoid would international 
oversight. Treaty negotiations gathered momentum over the later 1950s, eventually 
becoming intertwined with preparations for the International Geophysical Year (IGY) 
in 1957–1958.   
The IGY, a program of global geophysical research activity spearheaded by the US 
and managed by the International Council of Scientific Unions, catalysed two major 
Cold War developments: the conclusion of the Antarctic Treaty, and the inauguration 
of the so-called space age. According to former NASA historian Roger Launius, the 
US’ ultimate objective in promoting the IGY was to ensure its own free movement in 
all geophysical domains not already under settled sovereign control, including 
airspace above sovereign jurisdiction, and the Antarctic.48 In international legal terms, 
the US’ primary aim was to establish a right to full global satellite reconnaissance on 
the one hand, and a right to defend from aerial attack on the other. According to 
Launius, US promotion of international scientific collaboration during the IGY served 
as the ‘stalking horse’ through which those aims could be realised.49 The Soviet 
Union’s launch of Sputnik 1 and 2 in 1957 was leveraged by the US as establishing a 
precedent of freedom of international space, and the US quickly followed with the 
launch of its first orbital satellite.50    
Australia supported the US’ military objectives in Antarctica; but its own IGY 
participation was focused toward the consolidation of its claim to sovereignty over the 
AAT, including all natural resources within its claim.51 The mantle of scientific 
internationalism was readily adapted toward that end. The 1958 Australian National 
Antarctic Research Expedition (later named ANARE) was funded in part by a 
donation from Commonwealth Oil Refineries Ltd (COR Ltd), a subsidiary of British 
Petroleum Ltd (BP), in a deal brokered by Minister for External Affairs Richard 
Casey.52 BP also funded the British IGY expedition led by Vivian Fuchs, and the New 
Zealand expedition led by Sir Edmund Hilary. Richard Casey, routinely cited one of 
the major historical champions of the AAT and later Attorney-General, had family 
and professional connections with Australian extractive industry. Casey’s career 
began in training as a mining engineer, working for Great Fitzroy Mines NL at the 
Laloki Copper Mine near Port Moresby in New Guinea, later becoming Board 
chairman of the Mount Morgan Gold Mine near Rockhampton in Queensland, one of 
the most productive gold mines in the world at the time.53 As Minister for External 
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Affairs, Casey vehemently opposed any internationalisation of Antarctic governance, 
and insisted on protecting Australia’s sovereign resource claims in the AAT.54  
Despite Casey’s and COR’s aims, exploratory activity in Antarctica during the IGY 
failed to locate significant mineral resources. The failure of all claimants to identify 
exploitable reserves within Antarctic territory effectively cleared a way for the 
collaborative resolution that was to come.55  Amid significant flux in Antarctic 
negotiations over 1957–1958 – during which the Soviet Union too reserved the right 
to make a territorial claim, and South Africa, Belgium and Japan sought membership 
of any treaty regime – the Australian objective of maintaining a sovereign territorial 
claim with full prospective resource rights was eventually reflected in the Antarctic 
Treaty signed in 1959.56 Article IV famously froze the status quo of territorial claims, 
neither prohibiting nor explicitly recognising existing claims, but prohibiting new or 
expanded claims; and the question of the status of mineral resources was omitted from 
the treaty altogether.57 In place of an explicit territorial settlement, the Treaty asserted 
two core principles: agreement to use Antarctica for ‘peaceful purposes only’, 
prohibiting militarisation; and ‘freedom of scientific investigation’, meaning 
permissive access to claimed territory by all.58 Both principles were consonant with 
the US’ nascent space policy, which sought to preserve freedom of access whilst 
minimising risk of military attack.  These basic norms – against new territorial claims, 
against militarisation, and for scientific exploration – laid the foundations for 
international legal debates over domains beyond national jurisdiction for the rest of 
the twentieth century. The issue of natural resource extraction was left out of the 1959 
Antarctic Treaty, as IGY activity had failed to locate commercially attractive reserves. 
The legal issue of whether the Treaty’s permissive norm of ‘scientific exploration’ 
extended to resource exploration was thereby left for later debate.  
4. The Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: decolonisation, 
the continental margin, and common heritage 
Australia’s focus on expanding its field of sovereign resource rights was to play out in 
unexpected ways over the following decades, in treaty negotiations over resource 
rights in the law of the sea and in international space law. The popularisation of a 
global imaginary during the IGY – and the related adoption of scientific 
internationalism as a cloak for pursuing military and extractive objectives in the 
Antarctic Treaty – had immediate impacts on negotiations pertaining to space and the 
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seabed. With respect to space, the UN resolved to establish an ad hoc Committee on 
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) in December 1958.59 Noting the events 
of the IGY, the ad hoc Committee was charged with reporting on ‘the area of 
international co-operation and programmes in the peaceful uses of outer space which 
could appropriately be undertaken under United Nations auspices to the benefit of 
States irrespective of the state of their economic and scientific development’ – an 
inference to Antarctic Treaty negotiations, which had evaded internationalisation in 
both its institutional and normative dimensions. With respect to the seabed, the first 
UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I) was also held in 1958. It resulted 
in the four Geneva Conventions, on the territorial sea and contiguous zone, the 
continental shelf, the high seas, and fishing and conservation of living resources.60 The 
Geneva Conventions largely codified existing customary international law, with 
expanded rules of border delimitation.61 However, the issue of seabed resources 
beyond national jurisdiction was left untouched, for the same reasons the Antarctic 
Treaty avoided it: as the ILC noted in its preparatory report, there was little need to 
address regulation of resource extraction in the international seabed, as there was as 
yet no commercial case for mining.62 
As more decolonising states joined the UN system over the course of the 1960s, the 
law of the sea codified in the Geneva Conventions attracted increasing criticism, both 
for its European imperial origins and for its favouring of dominant powers in 
permitting laissez faire resource exploitation in areas beyond national jurisdiction.63 
The impetus to convene the third international conference on the law of the sea arose 
from this shifting balance of power within the UN system. That moment was seized to 
fateful effect in 1967 by Maltese diplomat Arvid Pardo, Malta’s first Permanent 
Representative to the UN.64 Pardo’s famous speech to the General Assembly – 
delivered within weeks of the Outer Space Treaty, with its language of ‘province of 
all mankind’ coming into effect in October 1967 – called for international co-
operation on a legal regime to regulate seabed resource exploitation. In response, the 
UN established a ‘Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor’ 
– COPUOS’ seabed twin.65 The Seabed Committee, as it became known, drafted the 
1970 Declaration of Principles governing the Seabed and the Ocean Floor beyond 
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National Jurisdiction.66 The 1970 Declaration asserted for the first time that the 
seabed and its resources ‘were’ ‘the common heritage of mankind’, meaning that all 
activities, including resource extraction, were to be carried out under an international 
regime established by treaty, ‘including appropriate international machinery’. Over 
the next two years, the UN undertook large scale preparations for a third international 
conference on the law of the sea.67   
In Australia, the brewing CHM debate seems to have been of little interest to the 
executive in the early years of UNCLOS III.68 The Commonwealth’s central objective 
in law of the sea negotiations was to expand the field of sovereign resource rights by 
securing recognition of an extended continental shelf. That objective had been 
established under the Gorton (1968–1971) and McMahon (1971–1972) governments, 
and was maintained throughout the Whitlam (1972–1975) and Fraser (1975–1983) 
governments. From 1972, the Whitlam government was focused on expanding 
Australia’s sovereign rights to the continental shelf and margin by whatever extent 
possible. The Commonwealth’s position centred on an expansive interpretation of 
‘margin’ as defined in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf.69 Given 
this objective, in the early years of UNCLOS III the Australian delegation focused on 
mounting calls for an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 200 nautical miles beyond 
the territorial sea, and specifically on the consequences of a universal EEZ on the 
prospects of securing recognition of an expansive continental margin. Due to 
exploratory information provided by the petroleum and gas industry, the 
Commonwealth had been aware from the early 1960s of the likelihood of significant 
reserves of petroleum and gas on the North West Shelf of the Australian continent, 
extending into waters that would fall within a Timorese EEZ.70 On the basis of the 
1958 Geneva Conventions, Australia had actively solicited and granted exploration 
licences in waters very close to prospective Timorese territorial waters. Licences were 
granted to petroleum companies including Woodside and the Atlantic Richfield of 
America (ARCO).71 Calls for an EEZ, whilst delivering one of the largest maritime 
zones in the world to Australia, therefore complicated the Commonwealth’s campaign 
to shore up its sovereign resource rights over oil and gas fields beyond its own 
prospective EEZ on the one hand – namely, in the Exmouth Plateau off Western 
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Australia – and on the other, in waters within the prospective EEZ of East Timor, 
were it to achieve political independence from Portugal.72  
The coalescing right to self-determination in international law – and specifically its 
impending deployment by the Timor Leste independence movement against colonial 
rule – therefore posed a direct challenge to Australia’s expansive interpretation of its 
sovereign resource rights under the 1958 Geneva Conventions. Following the UN 
Trusteeship Council’s support of Nauruan independence in 1968, the Commonwealth 
regarded votes for self-determination in Portuguese East Timor and New Guinea, 
Australia’s remaining UN trust territory, as inevitable; but it adopted very different 
strategic approaches in each case. The Whitlam government openly championed 
political independence for Papua and New Guinea.73 At the same time, however, the 
Commonwealth’s attention was trained on defensively consolidating Australian 
ownership and control over natural resources in the region. The irony of this position 
became evident in its approach to Timorese independence. In 1972, ahead of 
UNCLOS III, the McMahon government had secured a quid pro quo agreement with 
Indonesia regarding impending seabed negotiations. Australia would support 
Indonesia’s campaign for recognition of sovereignty of archipelagic states over waters 
enclosed by archipelagic baselines – then a potential challenge to open freedom of 
passage along major trade routes – and Indonesia would recognise Australian 
territorial sovereignty over oil and gas fields on Timor Leste’s side of a median line 
between prospective Australian and Timorese EEZs.74  
The Whitlam government adopted this arrangement with Indonesia on its election in 
December 1972. While Whitlam championed the causes of Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander land rights in the Northern Territory and of Papua New Guinean 
independence from his election in 1972, including a PNG delegation in UNCLOS 
negotiations from 1973, his government’s attitude toward the prospect of East 
Timorese independence was mercenary. A central platform of Whitlam’s election 
campaign was an audacious domestic policy of national ownership and effective 
control of all phases in the oil and gas production cycle, via a new Petroleum and 
Minerals Authority. Elected into a context of serious international upheaval leading 
up to the OPEC crisis in October 1973, the Whitlam executive was determined to 
secure the broadest resource field possible for Australian use. In a bid to provide 
certainty of tenure to existing and prospective license holders in the lead up to 
UNCLOS III, the Commonwealth introduced the Sea and Submerged Lands Act 1973 
(Cth), vesting in the Governor-General the power to proclaim the limit of the 
continental margin in accordance with the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial 
Sea and the Contiguous Zone, which allowed annexation of the seabed ‘to where the 
depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of 
the said areas’.75 The Sea and Submerged Lands Act thereby grounded territorial 
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claim in resource exploitability rather than geographic principle, against potential 
changes in the international law governing the delimitation of the continental shelf.  
At the same time, the Whitlam government excluded Portugal – still then the 
recognised sovereign power in East Timor – from maritime border negotiations over 
the Timor Sea, negotiating instead with Indonesia which had agreed in 1972 to 
support Australia’s claim in the North West Shelf. When Portugal withdrew from East 
Timor in 1975, the Whitlam government infamously threw its support behind 
Indonesia’s violent occupation rather than the Timorese independence movement. 
These events are well known due to Portugal’s later institution of ICJ proceedings 
against Australia for its later conclusion of a treaty with Indonesia regarding 
ownership of resources in the Timor Sea.76 The Whitlam government’s rhetorical 
support professed for NIEO principles of political self-determination and permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources in the early years of UNCLOS III need to be 
understood in this light.77 The Commonwealth leveraged NIEO rhetoric less in 
solidarity with the right of decolonising peoples to economic self-determination than 
in pursuit of ownership and control over natural resources in areas liable to fall within 
the territorial waters or EEZs of its decolonising neighbours.  
Australia’s negotiating position throughout UNCLOS III remained fixed on 
recognition of an expanded continental shelf and margin, and the resolution of 
potential conflict with neighbouring EEZs. The Department of Foreign Affairs was as 
alert to the significance of the continental shelf and EEZ debates for Australia’s 
resources claims in the AAT as it was for the North West Shelf. As such, debate in the 
UNCLOS First Committee over a seabed resources regime – and the legal content of 
the CHM principle – was a secondary concern. While the Australian delegation 
monitored US and Soviet critique of the CHM concept closely, the package deal 
approach adopted at UNCLOS III meant that the Commonwealth stayed open to 
accepting a CHM regime for the international seabed as a bargaining tool in its 
continental shelf and EEZ strategy.78 The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and 
Australia’s lead negotiator Keith Brennan used their participation in First Committee 
debates over the institutionalisation of CHM for seabed resources to head off any 
discussion of applying the CHM principle to Antarctic resources, and to promote the 
interests of domestic extractive industry, leading a campaign to mitigate the potential 
effects of future seabed exploitation on land-based producers.79 Australian mining 
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companies including Woodside, Western Mining and CRA were consulted, and their 
interests remained front of mind in the Australian delegation’s strategy.80 
In the comprehensive settlement reached at the eleventh session of UNCLOS III in 
1982, Australia supported the seabed regime laid out in Part XI – not because of any 
particular support for CHM, but because the DFA regarded its primary objectives of 
securing an expanded field of sovereign resources and preserving the interests of 
land-based producers to have been met.81 The possibility of claiming rights in the 
continental shelf ‘to the outer edge of the continental margin’ – and beyond a 200 
mile EEZ – was preserved; and provision for ‘fair import’ of minerals produced from 
the seabed was included, a protection for land-based producers spearheaded by the 
Australian delegation.82 However, despite an initially receptive response to the final 
form of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC), including the ‘parallel system’ 
for seabed exploitation provided for in Chapter XI, Australia signed but did not ratify 
the treaty.83 Although it had previously indicated acceptance of the Part XI framework 
for seabed resources governance, Australia’s support for LOSC was tempered by the 
election of US President Ronald Reagan who rejected it explicitly because of the Part 
XI regime, a position mirrored by UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.84 This late 
rejection of Part XI by Australia’s principal allies was to leave the law governing 
international seabed exploitation uncertain for another decade. 
5. The Moon Agreement: common heritage and Australian uranium  
Law of the sea negotiations largely overshadowed parallel negotiations over space 
resources, which occurred in the wings of the UN across the 1970s and early 1980s. 
Both seabed and space treaty regimes ultimately adopted the principle of common 
heritage, although the legal expression of the principle differed markedly between 
them. Australia supported the space resources settlement in the 1979 Moon 
Agreement before it did the seabed resources settlement, making the former its first 
official endorsement of the CHM principle; but even in the case of space, Australia’s 
objective in acceding to the treaty was to expand Australia’s sovereign resource base. 
Regulating resource exploitation on the moon and near bodies had been under debate 
in the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space from its establishment in 
1958. The strong association of the Antarctic with outer space instilled by the IGY 
spurred speculative consideration of the legal status of space resource rights, well in 
advance of the technological capacity to exploit. In 1960, the International Institute of 
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Space Law convened a working group to make proposals on the legal status of outer 
space. Its 1964 report proposed that celestial bodies or parts thereof should not be 
subject to ‘national or private appropriation’, an expansive framing that clearly 
applied to private proprietary as well as sovereign territorial claims.85 However, the 
scope of the proposed prohibition was limited to apply to national entities in 1966.  
The 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which declared space the ‘province of all mankind’ and 
prohibited national appropriation, therefore settled little. Academic and diplomatic 
debate on the legality of private appropriation of space resources intensified over the 
late 1960s and 1970s, as UNCLOS III negotiations on the seabed regime progressed. 
The US view, established during the adoption of the OST by the US Senate, was that 
the OST provided that private appropriation of resources once removed was 
permissible – a view consonant with prevailing understandings of res communis 
omnium – but that domicile states would be liable for any private actions in breach of 
international law. 86  That view was disputed by developing states, which drew 
connection with concurrent debates over Antarctica and the seabed to argue that 
private appropriation of lunar resources would serve the economic interests of a 
handful of developed states, in contradiction of the OST’s foundational principles.  
The Moon Agreement itself was drafted within the COPUOS between 1967 and 
1979.87 It was Argentinian diplomat Aldo Armando Cocca – a pioneer of international 
space law, from an Antarctic claimant state – who first suggested in June 1967 that a 
notion of res communis humanitatus be applied to the issue of space resource 
utilisation.88 Following a range of competing submissions to COPUOS from Poland, 
France and the Soviet Union, concerted debate on the legal principles to apply to 
space resources began in the Legal Sub-Committee of COPUOS in 1972, among 28 
member states.89  Australia was an early supporter of the CHM approach proposed by 
Argentina along with the US, the UK, Egypt, Iran, India, and Australia, as well as the 
bulk of developing countries who progressively joined the COPUOS over the early 
years. An active member of COPUOS, the Soviet Union expressed strong suspicion 
of CHM on account of its imprecision, and lack of practical need to settle an 
international regime, submitting its own working paper in 1973.90  
Over seven years of debate within the COPUOS Legal Sub-Committee, little 
agreement was reached on the adoption or content of a CHM approach to space 
resource utilisation. Over 1978 and 1979, however, an unusual set of events resulted 
in the adoption of CHM in the final form of the treaty. Austria, which had led the 
drafting process and strongly supported inclusion of CHM, submitted a consolidated 
draft in 1978 that circumvented disagreement by declaring the moon and its natural 
resources the common heritage of mankind, whilst formulating CHM as ‘find(ing) its 
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expression in the provisions of th(e) agreement’.91 This formulation was intended to 
sever space resource negotiations from parallel negotiations over CHM in the 
UNCLOS First Committee, and any related attempt to claim customary or jus cogens 
status for the principle. The Legal Sub-Committee submitted this consolidated draft to 
the COPUOS in 1979, which approved the final form of the Moon Agreement in July 
that year. Once the draft Moon Agreement was approved in COPUOS, the text was 
tabled in the UN’s Special Political Committee (SPC), established in 1961 to address 
issues of decolonization.92 The SPC recommended adoption by the UN General 
Assembly, which occurred without vote in December 1979. 93   Despite their 
unexpected acquiescence to the treaty text in 1979, neither the US nor the Soviet 
Union moved to sign, and Britain also backed away.94  
In stark contrast to the Commonwealth’s concerted focus on UNCLOS III, the UN’s 
adoption of the Moon Agreement received little official or public attention in 
Australia, which at that time had little commercial interest in the issues at stake. Over 
the 1970s, attention to space policy within the Department of Foreign Affairs was 
trained primarily on the international debate over sovereign air rights and 
geostationary orbit, prompted by the 1976 Bogota Declaration in which eight 
equatorial states asserted sovereignty over geostationary orbit above sovereign 
airspace.95 Australia participated in COPUOS and SPC negotiations over the 1970s, 
but with inconsistent degrees of attention and resourcing. Although the Australian 
delegation supported the final text of the Moon Agreement in 1979, the Fraser 
government made no moves toward signature between 1979 and 1984, when the 
Agreement entered into force.  
Australia’s position was to change suddenly under the Labor Hawke government in 
late 1984, resulting ultimately in accession to the Moon Agreement in mid-1986. As 
with the seabed regime, the Commonwealth’s reason for accepting the Moon 
Agreement had less to do with any support for the CHM principle itself than with 
domestic extractive interests. The Hawke government essentially acceded to the 
Moon Agreement to mitigate political fallout on the left following Hawke’s relaxation 
of Labor’s uranium mining policy.96 The archival record of cabinet deliberations 
reveals a hasty process of ad hoc consultation begun in October 1984, spearheaded by 
then-Minister for Foreign Affairs Bill Hayden.97 That process was based on the 
presumption that the Moon Agreement was first and foremost a nuclear disarmament 
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treaty. The Hawke government focused instead on the Agreement’s demilitarisation 
provisions, which reiterated the basic logic of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, and 
largely neglected its controversial CHM implications.98 Nuclear policy was one of the 
most volatile issues Hawke faced in his early years as Prime Minister, on both 
domestic and international fronts. Following his election in March 1983, Hawke 
walked a difficult line, endorsing both nuclear disarmament at international level, and 
increased uranium mining in Australia. A lifelong advocate of nuclear power, Hawke 
saw a key role for Australia in a global nuclear fuel cycle, a policy view developed in 
close concert with the Australian uranium mining industry.99 
Hawke’s electoral base was divided on this direction in party policy. Faced with mass 
rallies calling for nuclear disarmament and a ban on uranium in the first month of 
government, Hawke and Hayden opted to direct focus to Australia’s diplomatic 
record on disarmament, appointing Richard Butler as ‘roving’ Ambassador for 
Disarmament.100 At the same time, Hawke refused to question the US nuclear build-
up under Reagan, or the activity of US bases on Australian soil; and at the Labor 
Party Conference in July 1984, he moved to relax the party’s awkward ‘no new mines’ 
policy to allow uranium mining to commence at Olympic Dam in South Australia.101 
Olympic would soon join Ranger and Nabarlek in the Northern Territory to become 
Australia’s third operational uranium mine. Hawke’s softening of Labor’s nuclear 
policy split the party’s left, spurring a defection of members, who joined with anti-
uranium activists to form the new Nuclear Disarmament Party (NDP) that month.102 
The NDP united a loose coalition against Hawke’s nuclear policy, including the new 
Olympic Dam mine, the presence of US bases and warships, unreliable controls on 
the end use of exported uranium, and export to France.103  
The NDP fast became an appreciable threat to Hawke, who took advantage of high 
personal approval ratings to call an early election for December 1984. With only a 
few short months to stem the potential flow from its left, the Hawke government 
doubled down on its disarmament record. In October 1984, as the election campaign 
began, Hayden directed his department to “examine all multilateral disarmament … 
Treaties” to ensure that Australia’s record was “as complete as possible”.104 The 
Department of Foreign Affairs honed in on the Moon Agreement, drawing little 
connection to a decade of international debate over CHM. Hawke won the election in 
December 1984, but the NDP’s efforts made their mark. The NDP attracted over 7% 
of the senate vote and deprived Labor of control in the upper house. Anxious to 
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recoup votes, Hawke pledged ‘renewed vigour’ in his ‘unremitting efforts in the cause 
of peace and nuclear disarmament’.105 From February 1985, the Disarmament and 
Multilateral Section in the Department of Foreign Affairs forged ahead with its Moon 
Treaty plan, despite clear international disinterest. 106  In May 1986, Australia’s 
accession to the Moon Treaty was formally approved, as ‘the last multilateral 
disarmament treaty open to Australia to become a party to’.107 An instrument of 
accession was lodged with the UN that July. As such, Australia endorsed the adoption 
of CHM with respect to outer space well before it was to formally do so with respect 
to the seabed in the 1990s. Given the lack of Australian industrial interest at that time 
in space infrastructure or resources, the Department of Foreign Affairs regarded CHM 
in space as of little, and potentially positive, consequence, and a small price to pay to 
insulate increased uranium extraction from domestic critique. 
6. The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities: 
sovereign resource rights versus international regulation 
In the early 1980s, the endorsement of CHM in the 1979 Moon Agreement, and its 
protracted and difficult path to elaboration in Part XI of the LOSC in 1982, increased 
international attention on the legal status of Antarctic resources.108 As discussed 
above, the uneasy compromise between existing claimant parties formalised in the 
Antarctic Treaty only narrowly escaped direct diplomatic challenge from India in the 
United Nations in 1956 in the lead up to the IGY, when Nehru and Menon mounted a 
short-lived challenge to the pending Antarctic settlement on behalf of the Non-
Aligned Movement. The NAM challenge to the foundations of the ATS resurfaced in 
1982, this time led by Malaysia under Prime Minister Mahatir bin Mohamad.109 In a 
speech to the General Assembly in September 1982, Mahatir linked both the principle 
of decolonisation and the CHM regime in UNCLOS Part XI to the broader theme of 
resource regulation in domains beyond national jurisdiction.110 Mahatir then narrowed 
his focus to Antarctica, arguing that: 
‘like the seas and the sea-bed, those uninhabited lands belong to the international 
community. The countries now claiming them must give them up so that either the 
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United Nation can administer those lands or the present occupants can act as trustees for 
the nations of the world’.111 
Mahatir’s speech was prompted by the finalisation the Convention for the 
Conversation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) by ATS claimant 
and consultative parties in 1980. Malaysia sought support for its Antarctic challenge 
from fellow members of the Non-Aligned Movement in New Delhi in March 1983.112 
However, Malaysia’s campaign was met with predictable resistance from Argentina, 
and less predictable resistance from India, by that time itself preparing to accede to 
the ATS as a consultative party. Brazil had become a consultative party in 1975, and 
China was to follow in 1985. Despite this divergence of interests, the 1983 NAM 
Economic Declaration ultimately promoted Malaysia’s Antarctica campaign in the 
UN; but it avoided CHM language, calling instead for ‘comprehensive study’ of the 
ATS by the UN General Assembly, with a view to ‘widening international co-
operation’.113  When Malaysia formally requested that the matter be inscribed for 
debate in the UN General Assembly in 1983, all Antarctic Treaty Parties and 
Consultative Parties abstained from voting, and the question was referred to the First 
Committee without a vote.114 The matter was listed annually for General Assembly 
debate between 1983 and 1988. 
Malaysia’s raising of the ‘Antarctica question’ in the UN General Assembly followed 
formal recommencement in June 1982 had been prompted by the recommencement of 
mineral extraction negotiations within the Antarctic Treaty regime.115 Between 1982 
and 1988, ATS parties attempted the impossible task of devising a regime to regulate 
resource extraction that both preserved original claimants’ sovereign rights, and 
accommodated consultative party and external developing country calls for inclusion. 
As discussed above, the Antarctic Treaty had – partly at Australia’s insistence – 
avoided reference to resource extraction altogether, but declared a general freedom of 
scientific exploration. This cemented a crucial distinction between the Antarctic 
Treaty and the later space and seabed regimes in their approaches to resource 
exploitation. In the latter two treaty frameworks, the norm of ‘peaceful purposes’ 
explicitly included both scientific exploration and resource exploitation, and allowed 
all states formally equal access for both purposes, albeit under some future regime of 
international oversight to give effect to the CHM principle of benefit sharing. The 
Antarctic Treaty, on the other hand, permitted open scientific exploration, whilst 
leaving the question of resource exploitation unanswered. The attempt to insulate 
scientific from resource exploration was a logical consequence of the preservation of 
existing sovereign resource claims in Antarctica; but it inevitably proved absurd in 
practice. Exploration for petroleum, gas and mineral resources gathered pace over the 
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1970s, prompted in part by attempted nationalisations, the OPEC crisis, and 
declarations on the NIEO and permanent sovereignty over natural resources in the 
UN.116 In 1977, amid serious speculation regarding the grant of domestic licences to 
commercial entities, ATS parties agreed to a temporary moratorium on extractive 
activity to enable negotiation of a regulatory regime that would clarify the legal status 
of Antarctic resources.117   
Australia’s position on Antarctic mineral resources, established in the 1950s, was that 
the Antarctic Treaty’s freezing of sovereign claims preserved claims of exclusive and 
full sovereign resource rights.118 Unsurprisingly, that view was shared by claimant 
parties but not consultative parties, who argued for the extension of freedom of 
scientific exploration to resource exploitation. In response to the real possibility of 
challenge to claimant parties’ sovereign rights both outside and within the ATS, the 
Hawke government initially moved to temper its position on resource rights, 
following internal advice in 1983 that ‘concessions in the minerals area may have to 
be made so as to defuse the challenge to the [Antarctic Treaty] system’.119 In the first 
few years of negotiations, Australia therefore indicated willingness to consider an 
inter-party regulatory regime for resource exploration and exploitation, subject to 
claimant party rights to levy tax on activity within claimed areas.120 To counter 
escalating calls for full internationalisation of Antarctica, the Commonwealth 
conceded that such a regime should include ‘some form of external accommodation 
involving benefits for developing countries’. At the same time, it sought superior 
financial recognition of claimant parties, protection of land-based producers via 
prohibition of ‘unfair economic practices’ via state subsidisation, and environmental 
protections.121 Over the 1980s, however, negotiations progressively drifted away from 
these basic objectives. The final version of the Convention on the Regulation of 
Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA) concluded in June 1988 provided 
for the establishment of an Antarctic Mineral Commission, with delegated powers to 
grant exploration and development permits to regional Regulatory Committees. It did 
not include special financial rights for claimant parties, nor prohibitions on state 
subsidisation.122  
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From 1988, the Hawke government was internally divided over the costs and benefits 
of CRAMRA to the maintenance of Australia’s sovereign claim. Treasurer Paul 
Keating was critical of the potential of CRAMRA’s proposed regulatory regime to 
undermine Australia’s sovereign resource rights claim. Others within Cabinet were 
concerned over the domestic electoral fall-out on the left of supporting resource 
exploitation in Antarctica, as NGOs including Greenpeace campaigned for the 
continent to be declared a ‘world park’.123 Despite initially supporting the CRAMRA 
compromise, then, in 1989 Hawke ultimately opted to promote a mining ban for 
Antarctica instead. Hawke’s mining ban had a strategic double effect: it placated 
environmental NGOs and activists on the left, while preserving Australia’s sovereign 
resource claims within the AAT and its proclaimed EEZ.124 Domestically, Hawke was 
again faced in the late 1980s with the prospect of a new coalition of green left parties, 
this time ahead of the 1990 federal election. The Antarctic mining ban was 
unilaterally legislated in the Antarctic Mining Prohibition Act 1991 – domestic 
legislation an established Australian mode of asserting sovereignty over the AAT.125 
Australia’s move was widely hailed as an environmental watershed, in a global 
moment sensitised by a series of major oil spills culminating in the Exxon Valdez 
disaster in Alaska, and the rise of environmental NGOs and electoral movements. 
However, Australia’s imposition of a mining ban was at heart less a rejection of 
resource exploitation in Antarctica per se, than of the legal and financial terms of 
CRAMRA negotiated over the 1980s – and above all, of the risk a multilateral 
Antarctic Mineral Commission posed to the preservation of Australia’s claim to 
exclusive sovereign resource rights.126  
Australia’s abandonment of CRAMRA effectively shelved the Convention, which 
required all claimant states to join as parties. However, Australia was not the only 
deserter. The attempt made in the final text to preserve sovereign claims whilst 
providing for a centrally managed licensing regime left the legal status of resources 
and profits derived unclear, and the environmental provisions proposed were 
ambiguous. Neither claimant nor consultative parties were satisfied, nor extractive 
interests or environmental campaigners.127   Although CRAMRA was ultimately 
abandoned, Joyner and others have observed that the process was significant, in that it 
laid the normative groundwork for the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the 
Antarctic Treaty (the ‘Madrid Protocol’) that followed in 1991.128  The Madrid 
Protocol explicitly reinforced the Antarctic Treaty settlement itself, whilst designating 
Antarctica as a ‘natural reserve, devoted to peace and science’, and providing that 
‘(a)ny activity relating to mineral resources, other than scientific research, shall be 
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prohibited’. 129  The Protocol introduced environmental provisions for impact 
assessment and information sharing, and established a Committee for Environmental 
Protection. Most importantly, it provided mechanism for review after the expiration of 
fifty years, in effect asserting a moratorium on resource exploitation until 2041.  
7. Conclusion: Australia and the future of resource extraction in domains 
beyond national jurisdiction 
As Scott has long noted of the unusual détente established in the 1959 Antarctic 
Treaty, ‘there is no reason to be complacent as to its future viability or longevity’.130 
Of the three treaty regimes negotiated between the late 1950s and the early 1990s to 
regulate resource extraction in areas beyond national jurisdiction, only the Part XI 
regime in the LOSC has been implemented. The establishment of the International 
Seabed Authority occurred only after the 1994 Implementation Agreement. The 1994 
Agreement largely gutted the CHM principle of any distributive potential, thereby 
facilitating acceptance of the comprehensive LOSC framework.131 From the mid-
twentieth century onward, the question of how resource extraction beyond national 
jurisdiction should be regulated fractured into three geophysical- and function-
specific treaty frameworks. For several decades, this fragmentation worked to stave 
off open debate within international institutions regarding the common conceptual, 
political and ultimately metaphysical problems of environmental and distributive 
justice that pertain to resource exploitation in all three domains. It also worked to 
stave off open reckoning, at least within international institutions, with the extractive 
foundations of twentieth-century constructs of development, themselves derived from 
far older constructs of European imperialism, as TWAIL and Marxist scholars in 
international law have now comprehensively documented. To that extent, the 
Commonwealth’s consistent prioritisation of sovereign extractive interests, even 
where it seemed to adopt the CHM principle, merely reflects the broader ascendance 
of liberal economic development as the proclaimed normative foundation of post-war 
international ordering.  
The aim of this chapter, however, is not to provide a conceptual explanation of the 
Commonwealth’s carriage of Antarctic, outer space and seabed negotiations. It is 
simply to establish that across all three treaty frameworks, the Commonwealth has 
consistently worked to secure and expand the field of sovereign resource rights, and 
adopted the mantles of scientific internationalism, environmental protection, and 
common heritage only where it served that basic objective. Narratives that champion 
Australia’s environmental record in Antarctica and its formal adoption of common 
heritage with respect to the seabed and space tend to avoid reckoning with the fact 
that environmental, scientific and common heritage justifications can – and in fact 
have been – continuous with an approach to international law that remains at its core 
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extractive and expansionist. It is now an opportune moment to reassess both the 
history and the future of Australia’s approach to the problem of resource extraction 
beyond national jurisdiction. Following the upheavals of 2020, the durability and 
longevity of the ATS regime is now in question, as China and Russia test the limits of 
claimant states’ capacity and willingness to defend their distinctly twentieth century 
settlement. At the same time, rapid movement in private and public space activity 
over the last few decades have once again rendered the failure of agreement on the 
foundational principles of space resource law a geopolitical fault line. While the 
seabed regime administered by the International Seabed Authority is less contentious, 
due to its institutional implementation over the last 30 years and its embeddedness 
within a far more comprehensive and widely accepted LOSC, whether the transition 
from exploration to exploitation licensing can prove successful remains to be seen. As 
the normative foundations of each treaty regime again become live issues with 
potentially sprawling consequences, it is important for Australian international 
lawyers to ask the question of whether the Commonwealth’s identification of the 
national interest as extractive and expansionist is adequate, even on its own terms. 
 
